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LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW

The Tenth Circuit's survey period labor law decisions produced few surprises, although spawning two dissents by Judge Barrett. Three significant
cases are reviewed below. These decisions gain their interest either from
their clarification of existing law or their refusal to move from precedent
despite convincing challenges. While the Tenth Circuit was not in the forefront of labor law reform during this edition of the survey, in two areasthreats which constitute strike misconduct and the use of presumptions in
unfair labor practice hearings-the court addressed issues of national
relevance.
I.

A.

THREATS AS STRIKE MISCONDUCT

Existing Standardsfor Strike Misconduct

In Midwest Solvents, Inc. v. NLRB,' a Tenth Circuit panel majority refused to join two sister circuits in rejecting the National Labor Relations
Board's (NLRB or Board) standard for determining when threats are misconduct sufficient to justify an employer's refusal to reinstate a striking employee. 2 The First 3 and Third 4 Circuits have adopted an "objective" test,
under which threats themselves will be deemed strike misconduct if, under
the circumstances in which they were uttered, the threats could reasonably
1. 696 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1982).
2. 696 F.2d at 767. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982),
protects concerted employee activity, including strikes. See id. §§ 157-163. This protection,
however, is not absolute.
An employer must rehire employees involved in an economic strike if positions are open
following the strike. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967). Failure to
reinstate striking employees to available positions constitutes an unfair labor practice, because
without the reinstatement requirement an employer could chill the right to strike by penalizing
those who exercise this right. Id. The employer, however, can refuse to reinstate striking employees if the refusal is not motivated by an anti-union purpose, but is instead based upon a
legitimate and substantial business reason. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers Co., 388 U.S. 26, 34
(1967). Individual strike misconduct, such as a coercive or threatening act directed at nonstriking workers, furnishes a legitimate basis for refusing to reinstate a striking employee because
such misconduct does not involve the exercise of a protected right and because such misconduct
can render an employee "unfit for further service." NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811,
815-16 (7th Cir. 1946). See also Associated Grocers of New England v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333
(1st Cir. 1977); NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Wichita
Television Corp.. 277 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Cambria Clay Prod. Co., 215 F.2d 48
(6th Cir. 1954). Cf NLRB v. Fansteel Melhallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253 (1939) (employer
not compelled to reinstate employees committing torts against the employer's property; to require reinstatement of such employees would hinder labor law's purpose of seeking peaceful
solution to labor disputes). Not all misconduct is sufficiently serious to justify refusal to reinstate. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1967). The
issue in strike misconduct cases is therefore determining which kinds of misconduct are sufficiently serious to justify refusal to reinstate. See, e.g., Midwest Solvents, 696 F.2d at 766.
3. Associated Grocers of New England v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333 (1st Cir. 1977).
4. NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977).
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"coerce or intimidate" non-striking employees. 5 The NLRB, however, applies an "animal exuberance" test, under which threats alone cannot justify
refusal to reinstate. 6 In order to constitute strike misconduct under the
NLRB standard a striker's threats must be "accompanied by . . . physical
acts or gestures that would provide added emphasis or meaning to [the]
words." 7 Interestingly, in Midwest Solvents the Tenth Circuit both refused to
adopt the objective test and denied that it was applying the animal exuberance test.8
B.

Midwest Solvents

The Midwest Solvents case arose out of a twenty-nine day economic
strike. 9 Following the strike the employer, Midwest, refused to reinstate two
strikers, Donald and Roy Lassen, accusing them of strike misconduct.' 0 The
Lassen's brought unfair labor practice charges against Midwest resulting in
an administrative law judge's order of reinstatement." Midwest appealed
this order and the NLRB affirmed the administrative judge,' 2 as did the
3
Tenth Circuit. '
Donald Lassen was charged with two instances of misconduct. 14 The
first involved a visit, accompanied by another striker, to the apartment of
Bob Call, a non-striking worker.' 5 Call refused to open the door, and therefore could not identify which of the two strikers told him he better "watch"
himself because "some of the boys might get rowdy."' 6 Midwest also
charged Donald Lassen with threatening three college students temporarily
working at its plant.1 7 Only Lassen and a companion testified about what
5. Associated Grocers, 562 F.2d at 1336 (quoting McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 528); McQuaide, 552
F.2d at 528. The McQuaide court adopted the standard set out in Local 542, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. dented, 379 U.S. 826 (1964), wherein the
court stated: "The test of coercion and intimidation is not whether the misconduct proves effective. The test is whether the misconduct is such that, under the existing circumstances, it may
reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of rights protected under the
Act." 328 F.2d at 852-53 (quoted in McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 527-28). Local 542 articulated the
"objective" test for coercion in the context of an unfair labor charge brought against a union,
not an employer. 328 F.2d at 852.
6. E.g., McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 527. The phrase "animal exuberance" is taken from Milk
Wagon Drivers Union, Local 752 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
Meadowmoor held that picketing could not be suppressed merely because the pickets engaged in
"a trivial rough incident or a moment of animal exuberance." Id. at 293.
7. McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 527.
8. 696 F.2d at 767.
9. An economic strike is a strike to secure union demands, rather than a protest against an
employer's unfair labor practices. See NLRB v. Juniata Packing Co., 464 F.2d 153, 155 (3d Cir.
1972).
10. 696 F.2d at 765. Midwest originally refused to reinstate six striking workers. After
further investigation Midwest allowed one of the six to return to work. Two others did not
challenge Midwest's action. The remaining three, Donald, Roy and Harold Lassen, filed unfair
labor practice charges against Midwest based on the failure to reinstate. Id
11. Id

12. Midwest Solvents, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1282, 1282 (1980), enforced, 696 F.2d 763 (10th
Cir. 1982).
13. See 696 F.2d at 767.
14. Id at 766.
15. Id
16. Id.
17. Id.
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was said to the three; they denied threatening the students although Lassen
admitted asking them not to be "scabs." 1
At the preliminary hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Donald Lassen had threatened both Call and the three college
students.' 9 The ALJ found, however, that both threats were isolated incidents insufficient to warrant denial of reinstatement. 20 The NLRB affirmed
this decision, noting that there was no evidence that the threats were anything more than "the type of impulsive, trivial misdeed which we have
found, in the past, to be insufficient to warrant a denial of reinstatement to a
''
protected striker."
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Board's order, holding that "[absent]
other threatening statements or . . . some coercive action, [Lassen's statements were] too ambiguous to be considered a threat."' 22 In support of this
conclusion the court cited NLRB v. W.C McQuaide, Inc. ,23 yet refused to
adopt McQuaide's objective test. 2 4 Apparently, therefore, the presence of two
strikers outside the apartment door of a non-striker is not a coercive action
sufficient to raise a threat to the level of strike misconduct.
Roy Lassen was denied reinstatement because, while picketing, he
threatened Donald Caudle, a farmer making deliveries across the picket line
to Midwest's plant.2 5 Roy said that he would blow up or burn up Caudle's
combine if Caudle continued making deliveries. 26 Caudle subsequently
crossed the picket line several times without further interference from the
strikers. 27
The NLRB characterized Roy's threat as minor misconduct and ordered reinstatement. 28 The court of appeals enforced the Board's order for
several reasons: 1) there was a question as to whether Roy Lassen made the
threat;29 2) Caudle apparently was not frightened by the threat; 30 and
3) Caudle was free from subsequent interference. 3 1 The court characterized
Roy Lassen's statement as "animal exuberance, the result of high emotions
18. Id at 767.
19. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1291.
20. Id. at 1292.
21. Id at 1282.
22. 696 F.2d at 766 (citing McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 766).
23. 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977).
24. 696 F.2d at 767. The court's supporting citation to McQuaide is problematic because
McQuaide adopted the "objective test" which the Tenth Circuit conspicuously avoided. Id. Apparently the court was only attempting to show that Donald Lassen's conduct did not constitute
strike misconduct by any standard. The citation may also have been an indication that the
court is willing to find misconduct through threats alone in the proper case. Cf id. at 766 (no
strike misconduct "in absence of other threatening statements or of some coercive action") (emphasis supplied),
25. Id. at 767.
26. Id
27. Id
28. Id.
29. Id. at 767 n.4. The opinion had previously noted that an employer's determination not
to reinstate for strike misconduct must be based on evidence that the striker personally engaged
in the alleged misconduct. Id at 765 (citing NLRB v. Wichita Television Corp., 277 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1960)).
30. 696 F.2d at 767.
31. Id.
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and frustration on the picket line," and therefore protected conduct. 32
The majority appears to have been content to defer to the expertise of
the Board in determining the misconduct issue. The court found the Board's
decisions supported by substantial evidence and declined to rule on Midwest's contention that the Board had applied an improper test. Instead, the
court held that "[t]he refusal to reinstate would not be proper under any of
the standards suggested by Midwest. Accordingly, we need not decide the
' 33
merits of the objective test."
Judge Barrett, the sole dissenter, disagreed with the majority and would
have adopted the objective test. 34 By this test, Judge Barrett reasoned, the
actions of Roy and Donald Lassen would "clearly constitute such misconduct which amounts to coercion and intimidation" warranting denial of
35
reinstatement.
Curiously, Judge Barrett injected a strong element of subjectivity into
the objective test when he observed that the ALJ found that the Lassens'
conduct placed others in fear, and that it was his view that the Lassens'
actions were calculated threats. 36 While Judge Barrett's observations may
have been offered solely as evidentiary support of the objective unreasonableness of the Lassens' conduct, his comments do reflect the subjective basis
upon which several circuits have decided strike threat cases. Although the
standard is often not articulated, threats have been characterized on the basis of their effect on the non-striker, 37 or on the striker's subjective intent. 38
C.

Evaluation of Standardsfor Characteriztng Threats as Strike Misconduct
1.

Subjective Approach

Subjective tests have the obvious disadvantage of being difficult to apply. Intent and effect do not always admit of easy discovery. Although the
effect of a threat may be manifest in the reaction of a non-striker, the lack of
response may indicate no more than the non-striker's bold constitution or his
desperate need of a job. Similarly, if the intent of the striker is the test, the
court is placed in the dubious position of having to determine just how serious the striker is about carrying out the threat. Further, the striker is punished for his state of mind, not, as is more appropriate, for engaging in
inexcusable conduct.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id
Id at 768 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id

37. See NLRB v. Trumbull Asphalt Co., 327 F.2d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 1964) (threats were
misconduct when they resulted in non-striker leaving work for five weeks); NLRB v. Efco Mfg.,
Inc., 227 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956) (threats were misconduct
when they placed employer in fear of imminent beating).
38. Se NLRB v. Pepsi Cola Co., 496 F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir. 1974) (line drawn at "conduct
that is intended to threaten or intimidate non-strikers"). See also NLRB v. Hartmann Luggage
Co., 453 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1971) (distinguishing picket line rhetoric from threats intended
literally).
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The "Animal Exuberance" Standard

The NLRB suggests use of the animal exuberance test, under which
threats alone can never justify a refusal to reinstate. 39 The test ensures that
strikers are not to suffer the harsh penalty of losing their jobs because of
impulsive words spoken in the heat of the moment during the course of a
protected activity. The test overlooks, however, an employee's right not to
join in a concerted activity, guaranteed by section 7 of the National Labor
41
Relations Act. 4° Section 8(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of section 7 rights. Although the strike misconduct of an individual is not an unfair labor practice, clearly a significant part of Congress'
intent in enacting section 7 was to protect the employee's right of choice. To
assert that words alone cannot intimidate is to shut one's eyes to the coercive
power of language, and to subvert a worker's right of choice. The animal
exuberance test therefore protects the striking worker's rights at the expense
of the non-striking worker.
The First and Third Circuits criticize the "animal exuberance" test in
other terms. In Associated Grocers of .ew England v. NLRB, 42 the First Circuit
found the "animal exuberance" test "too inelastic to provide a reliable
means for distinguishing serious misconduct or threats from protected activity."' 4 3 A similar rationale pervaded the Third Circuit's McQuaide opinion;
the McQuaide court framed the question as "whether a threat is sufficiently
44
egregious not whether there is added emphasis."
3.

The "Objective" Test

Realizing that the problem presented by strike misconduct is to distinguish actions sufficiently egregious to justify refusal to reinstate while simultaneously preserving the vitality of collective action, 45 the objective test
proposes a solution in the ubiquitous "reasonable person." The test is
whether a threat reasonably tends to coerce or intimidate, ensuring that
neither employer nor worker is penalized for engaging in arguably proper
activity. The test does not require a physical gesture, 46 thereby recognizing
the coercive potential of words and protecting an employee's right of choice.
The equitable nature of the objective test is further demonstrated by its
39. Associated Grocers, 562 F.2d at 1336; .4fcQuaide, 552 F.2d at 528. The Eleventh Circuit
has found that the animal exuberance test gives better protection to an employee's right to
engage in concerted activity than does the objective test. Georgia Kraft Co. v. NLRB, 696 F.2d
931, 939 (1 lth Cir. 1983).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). This section provides, in relevant part, that "[e]mployees shall
have the right . . . to engage in . . . concerted activities . . . and shall also have the right to

refrain
41.
42.
43.
44.
fails to
45.
46.

from any or all of such activities.
Id
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1982).
562 F.2d 1333 (1st Cir. 1977).
Id at 1336.
552 F.2d at 527. The court observed that focusing on the presence of physical activity
concentrate the inquiry upon the actual nature of an employee's conduct. See id.
Set supra note 2.
E.g., McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 527.
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application. The objective test does not find strike misconduct in words
alone without the added weight of surrounding circumstances. 47 Misconduct through threats has been found in strikes marked by incidents of vandalism and harassment, 48 where non-strikers have been followed to delivery
points, 49 or to their homes, 50 or when their egress has been blocked. 5 1 A
threat in such circumstances has added coercive force, as it does when the
52
threat is made with forty to fifty picketers nearby.
The objective test, as applied, has also had a subjective element. For
example, Judge Barrett's dissent relied on evidence that the Lassens' threats
had placed other employees in fear. 53 Similarly, the Associated Grocers court
noted that a threatened applicant left the premises of the plant without submitting an application; 54 evidently the court found the applicant's motive
significant, even though motive is intrinsically subjective. While consideration of subjective reaction may be important in characterizing the reasonableness of strike-related conduct, it is important to strictly limit the weight
given such evidence. To effectively separate reasonable and unreasonable
conduct, the objective test must go beyond the reactions of individuals in a
55
particular case.
D. Conclusion
The refusal by the Tenth Circuit to apply the objective test may signify
nothing more than that Midwest Solvents was the wrong case in which to disrupt precedent. Strike misconduct is an area in which the conscience of the
court might be easily aroused. If, in another case, the animal exuberance
test would require reinstatement, but the threats, given the surrounding circumstances, were clearly coercive, the Tenth Circuit might adopt the objective test. In doing so, the court would be reaching a result more consistent
with the National Labor Relation Act's goal of facilitating industrial peace 56
47. "The test is whether the misconduct is such that, under the circumstances existing, it may
reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate ..
" Id at 528 (quoting Local 524, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850, 852-53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1964))
(emphasis supplied).
48. McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 528. See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d
511, 512 (5th Cir. 1971), in which the Fifth Circuit articulated no standard, but found strike
misconduct in a vulgar invective and hand sign; it may have been significant that the striker
involved had been engaged in other, more violent activity during the strike. See id at 512-13.
49. McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 526-27.
50. Associated Grocers, 562 F.2d at 1337.

51. Id
52. Id at 1336.
53. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
54. Associated Grocers, 562 F.2d at 1336.
55. Associated Grocers demonstrates the proper approach to the use of evidence of subjective
reaction. The Associated Grocers court remanded to the Board, with instructions to apply the
objective test, the case of a striker ordered reinstated because his threats had not deterred a nonstriker from applying for a position. The court rejected the notion that filing the job application
proved the applicant had not been coerced, noting that while the applicant's subjective reaction
was important, that reaction could not in itself satisfy an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the striker's conduct. Id at 1337.
56. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253 (1939); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-43 (1937).
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and protecting an employee's freedom of choice. 5 7
II.

NLRB

USE OF PRESUMPTIONS WHEN CERTIFYING HEALTH CARE
BARGAINING UNITS

Beth IsraelHospitaland Geriatric Center v. NLRB 58 (Beth Israel II) was an en
banc rehearing of an employer challenge claiming that due process protections precluded use of a presumption of unit appropriateness at an unfair
labor practice hearing seeking to force an employer to negotiate with a certified employee bargaining unit. 59 The Tenth Circuit rejected the challenge,
holding that reliance on the presumption of unit appropriateness was permissible, even though the presumption relieved the Board's General Counsel 60 of the burden of persuasion on an element of an unfair practice
62
charge. 6 1 Chief Judge Seth and Judge Barrett dissented from this holding.
A.

Background

The NLRB's General Counsel, as the moving party in an unfair labor
practice hearing, has the burden of persuasion on the unfair practice
charge. 6 3 The Board, however, had permitted the General Counsel to rely
on a presumption which required the employer to prove the inappropriateness of a previously certified unit. 6 4 Employers appealed this action, contending that because the issue of appropriateness was central to the unfair
practice charge, due process required that the General Counsel bear the bur57. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
58. 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), cert. dsmi sedper stipulation, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
59. The NLRB has the responsibility for determining which employee units are appropriate for collective bargaining purposes. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). Certification of a bargaining
unit as appropriate is made following a nonadversarial representation hearing. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.21 (1983). Accord Inland Empire District Council, Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union v.
Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 706 (1945). The certification decision can be made either directly by the
Board or by one of its regional directors. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(b), 159(b) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 101.
21 (1983). This function is generally referred to as "determining unit appropriateness."
Once a bargaining unit has been certified, an employer is required to negotiate with that
certified unit, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982); failure to do so constitutes an unfair labor practice. Id There is no right to have a certification decision reviewed directly. A.F. of L. v.
NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). Accord Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 139
(1971). To obtain judicial review of the determination the employer must refuse to bargain
with the certified unit, be charged with an unfair labor practice, and raise the inappropriateness
of the bargaining unit as a defense in the unfair labor practice proceeding. A.F. of L. v. NLRB,
308 U.S. 401 (1940). The circuit courts then have power to review the determination of unit
appropriateness through the grant of jurisdiction to review the Board's unfair labor practice
decisions. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e)-(f) (1982). Because the unit certification reflects on exercise
of the Board's discretion, however, the finding of unit appropriateness cannot be overturned
unless the Board has abused its discretion. Beth Israelil,688 F.2d at 699-700; see Packard Motor
Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947).
60. The NLRB's General Counsel represents the agency in unfair practice proceeding. See
29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982).
61. Beth Israel II, 688 F.2d at 701.
62. See id. at 701 (Barrett, J., dissenting); id. at 704 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
63. Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450, 456 (10th Cir. 1981),
overruledin part, Beth Israel Hosp. and Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), cert.
dsmissedper stipulatzon, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
64. See Beth Israel Hosp. and Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir.
1981) (Beth Israel i), reo'd in part, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (en banc rehearing), cert. dsmissedper
stipulation, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
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den of persuasion on this issue. 65 This argument was supported by citation
to Federal Rule of Evidence 301,66 which Congress had expressly made applicable to unfair labor practice hearings "so far as practicable. ' 6 7 Because
Rule 301 bars presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion, the Board's
approval of a burden-shifting presumption allegedly vitiated the due process
protection provided by allocating the burden of proof to the General Counsel, 68 thereby violating the employers' rights.
The challenge outlined above was first considered by a Tenth Circuit
panel in Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB. 69 Presbyterian/St. Luke's
held that the Board could not permit the use of a presumption which required the employer to bear the burden of persuasion on its contention that
a certified bargaining unit was inappropriate. 70 Proof that a certified bargaining unit is appropriate is necessary to establish that the asserted unfair
practice (refusal to bargain) 7 I has occurred. 72 Because the Federal Rules of
Evidence, including Rule 301, were applicable to the unfair practice hearing, 73 it was impermissible to use a presumption which shifted the burden of
proof on any element of the unfair practice charge.7 4 Two panel decisions
following this holding were the subject of the en banc rehearing in Beth Israel
11.75

B.

The Majorty Opi'on

The majority in Beth IsraelII overruled the Presbyterian/St.Luke's restriction on the use of presumptions of unit appropriateness at unfair labor prac65. See generaly Beth Israel II, 688 F.2d at 702-704 (Barrett, J., dissenting). The majority
opinion does not address the employers' challenge in due process terms, which may be a central
flaw in the opinion. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
66. FED. R. EVID. 301 provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or
by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with the evidence, to rebut or meet the presumption, but
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom itwas originally
cast.
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
68. Cf Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (recognizing that burden of proof acts as
due process procedural mechanism).
69. 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981),ovemledinpart, Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v.
NLRB, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dsmissedper stipulatibn, 103 C. St. 433 (1982).
70. 653 F.2d at 456. Presbytertan/St. Luke's also held that the Board could not rely on its
traditional "community of interests" test when certifying health care bargaining units, but must
apply a "disparity of interests" test. Id at 457. Further, the Board was required to include a
specific statement explaining why the certified unit did not result in an undue proliferation of
bargaining units in the health care industry. Id This holding, although not before the Tenth
Circuit in Beth Israel
I, see 688 F.2d at 698, was expressly approved by the circuit en banc. Id
at 700.
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
72. See 653 F.2d at 456. For a fuller explanation of the refusal-to-bargain unfair labor
practice, see supra note 59.
73. 653 F.2d at 456.
74. Id
75. Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1981) (Beth
Israel 1), rev'd in part, 682 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dsmissedper stipulation, 103 S. Ct.
433 (1982); St. Anthony Hosp. System v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part,
688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. disnmssedper stipulation, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
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tice hearings.7 6 The first step in reaching this decision was an examination
of the nature of the decision to certify a bargaining unit as appropriate. Certification of unit appropriateness is initially made at a representation hearing. 7 7 Congress intended that the determination of unit appropriateness be
made primarily through the Board's exercise of its expertise and experience
with the labor relations problems existing in a particular economic sphere.78
Thus, the process of unit determination at the representation hearing was
not subject to strict rules of evidence; the Board was entitled to make its
initial determination of appropriateness through the use of any procedural
devices-including presumptions creating a burden of persuasion-which
79
were justified by experience and which were not arbitrary.
The majority's second step was to examine Supreme Court precedent
concerning the Board's obligation to make an independent review of a unit
certification when that certification is challenged through an unfair practice
proceeding. Citing Magnesium Casling Co. v. NLRB,8 ° the majority stated that
the Supreme Court had established that the Board was not required to reconsider the issue of unit appropriateness during the unfair practice proceeding.8 1 Rather, the Board had discretion to require rehearing on the issue,
adopt the conclusion entered following the representation hearing, or make
82
an independent decision.
In light of the two principles of law discussed above, the majority concluded that the question of unit appropriateness was not a factual question
to be resolved during the unfair practice hearing.8 3 Accordingly, the General
Counsel had no burden of persuasion on the issue of unit appropriateness,
and the Federal Rules of Evidence did not provide a procedural framework
84
for determining whether the bargaining unit had been properly certified.
Essentially, because the determination of unit appropriateness was committed to Board discretion, Rule 301 could not control the Board's use of presumptions.8 5 Hence, the Board's use of a presumption "violating" Rule 301
did not, in the context of a determination of unit appropriateness, constitute
a denial of due process.8 6 Additionally, because judicial review existed to
ensure that the Board's discretion was not exercised arbitrarily, excluding
the issue of unit appropriateness from the unfair practice hearing's adver76. See Beth IsraelI, 688 F.2d at 698, 700-01.
77. See supra note 59.
78. See 688 F.2d at 699.
79. Id
80. 401 U.S. 137 (1971).
81. 688 F.2d at 700-01 (citing Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 141
(1971)). Accord Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 161 (1941).
82. 688 F.2d at 700-01.
83. Id at 701.
84. Id at 700-01.
85. Id
86. The majority does not address the question on rehearing in terms of the denial vel non
of due process. The question presented to the court, however, was whether due process protection permitted use of a presumption relieving the General Counsel of the burden of persuasion
on any element of the unfair practice charge. Id at 702 (Barrett, J., dissenting). Thus, the
majority's reasoning and conclusion have been presented in terms of their due process
implications.
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sarial environment did not deny an employer's due process rights. 8
C.

7

The Dissents
1. Judge Barrett

Judge Barrett's dissent was premised on his perception that due process
required that an employer be accorded a full adversarial hearing on every
element of the unfair practice charge.88 There was no indication in the National Labor Relations Act that the issue of unit appropriateness was entitled
to unique treatment; rather, the Act stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence were applicable to all unfair practice proceedings. 8 9 Further, the
Rules were made applicable to unfair practice proceedings in order to provide protection against arbitrary action by the Board. 90 The majority's
holding was therefore directly and indirectly 9 contrary to the statutorily
mandated restrictions of Rule 301. Additionally, the majority's holding subverted the judiciary's power to provide a meaningful guarantee against arbitrary Board decisions. Judge Barrett would have upheld Presbyterian/St.
Luke's and held that due process bars the use, in an unfair practice proceeding, 92 of a presumption which relieves the General Counsel of the burden of
93
persuasion on any element of an unfair practice charge.
2.

Chief Judge Seth's Dissent

Chief Judge Seth's dissent was grounded in his concern that the majority's holding would render judicial review of this class of unfair practice
charges virtually useless. By permitting the Board to use a presumption
which relieved it of the burden of producing any evidence, the court would
not have a meaningful basis for determining whether the Board had acted
arbitrarily. 94 Excusing the Board from producing evidence by characterizing unit appropriateness as a nonfactual, discretionary determination would
eliminate the check on arbitary action provided by a record setting forth all
facts constituting a basis for agency action. 95 Because application of Rule
87. See id. at 701.
88. Judge Barrett succinctly captured the essence of his dissent in summing up his opinion:
In any unfair labor practice proceeding, there must be a full and complete adversarial
hearing. The hospitals were not accorded such a proceeding. The Board was obligated to present evidence in the unfair labor practice proceedings (through its General
Counsel) which effectively met the burden of persuasion. This and this only could
meet the measure of a "full and adequate" hearing ....
Id at 704 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
89. Id at 703 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982)).
90. See 688 F.2d at 703-04 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
91. in addition to finding a direct contravention of Rule 301 in the majority holding,
Judge Barrett characterized the majority's approach as permitting the Board to treat a presumption as evidence, and stated that this was an impermissible use of presumption under Rule
301. Id. at 702 (citing J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 301-4 to 301-7
(1982)).
92. Judge Barrett limited his analysis to the use of presumptions at unfair practice proceedings. 688 F.2d at 701 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
93. Id at 704.
94. Id at 705 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 706.
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301 to the unfair practice proceeding would ensure the necessary record
while the majority's approach would not, Chief Judge Seth dissented.
D.

Analysts

There are two significant shortcomings in the majority opinion. The
first is its failure to examine the legislative intent behind the statutory requirement to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence to unfair practice proceedings. The statute only requires that the Rules be used so far as
practicable.96 The majority's recognition of an exception to this mandate
would have been more convincing if the opinion had demonstrated that the
statutory requirement was not intended to affect the characterization of a
particular issue as factual, or if the opinion had demonstrated that it was not
"practicable" to apply the Rules to the issue of unit certification.
The second, more serious flaw is the failure to demonstrate that the rule
of Magnesum Casting97 was applicable when the Board reviewed certification
decisions based primarily upon a Board-created presumption. Magnesium
Casting and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 98 its progenitor, both involved
review of unfair labor practice proceedings following certification hearings
which had resulted in fully developed records. It was in that context that
the Court held that the two procedurally distinct proceedings were essentially two parts of a unitary proceeding, and that it was therefore unnecessary, at the unfair practice proceeding, for the Board to reconsider its
decision entered following the representation hearing. 99 The majority opinion in Beth Israel II would clearly have been a more valuable precedent had
it explicitly considered the extent to which due process concerns are satisfied
by a unitary proceeding in which the government relies throughout on a
presumption. Similarly, the opinion would have gained persuasiveness had
it engaged in the interest balancing methodology the Supreme Court has
adopted for due process challenges to the adequacy of a particular agency
proceeding. 100
Although the majority opinion might have been strengthened by including either or both of the above analyses, it does appear to adequately
respond to the due process concerns raised by the dissenters. Determination
of an appropriate bargaining unit is a function which is primarily committed to the NLRB and which requires a significant degree of expertise. The
majority's approach would prevent arbitrary action by retaining judicial review of the rationality of a particular presumption. 10 ' Additionally, the em96. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
97. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
98. 313 U.S. 146 (1941).
99. Id. at 158-62.
100. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). A Tenth Circuit panel recently recognized that it should not dispose of due process challenges on the basis of Supreme Court precedent which did not address the exact challenge before the court and which was decided before
the era of interest-balancing jurisprudence. See United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672 (10th Cir.
1982). Although Schell was a criminal case, no compelling reason exists not to apply its cautious
approach to due process challenges when considering civil cases.
101. Cf 688 F.2d at 699 (courts should defer to NLRB discretion and expertise, including
presumptions drawn from past experience, subject to showing of reasonableness).
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ployer always has the chance to meet the burden of persuasion imposed by
0 2
the presumption of appropriateness.
One final point deserves mention. NLRB regulations state that the purpose of a representation hearing is to develop "as full a statement of the
10 3
pertinent facts as may be necessary for determination of the case."'
Neither the majority or dissenting opinions examine whether use of a presumption eliminating the obligation of any party to introduce evidence of
appropriateness is consistent with existing regulations.
III.

"BENCHING" As INTERNAL UNION DISCIPLINE

The dispute in Hackenburg v. InternationalBrotherhoodof Boilermakers 104 had
its roots in a wildcat strike by the ten plaintiffs. 10 5 The Union imposed, as a
penalty for the strike, a ninety day "benching," that is, deprivation of assignment to jobs through the Union-controlled hiring hall. 10 6 The sanction was
imposed pursuant to a provision in the collective bargaining agreement with
the employer which required the Union to "bench" members fired for
misconduct. 107

Suit was brought in federal district court by the plaintiffs, alleging that
the benching violated Colorado labor law, that the Union breached its duty
to fairly represent its members (through entering into a collective bargaining
provision calling for benching of fired employees), and that the summary
benching violated section 101(a)(5) of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959I08 (Landrum-Griffin Act), which provides procedural protections for Union members upon whom a union is imposing sanctions. On cross motions for summary judgment the district court found that
federal law preempted Colorado labor law, that there was no breach of the
duty to fairly represent in negotiating the collective bargaining agreement,
and that application of the sanction to seven voluntary strikers did not violate the Landrum-Griffin Act. 10 9 The trial court held, however, that application of the sanctions to three claimed involuntary strikers violated the
protection of section 101(a)(5), and rejected the Union's motion for summary judgment as to these three plaintiffs.1 10
The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's determination on all issues
except the holding in favor of the involuntary strikers.III The court recognized that the union's duty to fairly represent created no obligation to refrain from accepting a collective bargaining agreement not entirely
102. Note, however, that one reason Rule 301 rejected the "presumption-as-evidence" approach was the difficulty in determining the proper evidentiary weight to give a presumption.
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 91, at 301-4 to 301-7.
103. 29 C.F.R. § 101.20(c) (1983).
104. 694 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1982).
105. Id at 1238.
106. Id at 1237-38.
107. Id at 1238.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1982).
109. 694 F.2d at 1238.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 1239-40.
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beneficial to its members.'" 2 Similarly, the court found there was no breach
in the Union's operation of a hiring hall which, on balance, benefited Union
members." 13 The preemption ruling was upheld without discussion." 14
As noted, however, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the three plaintiffs who claimed they had
not willingly joined the strike."1 5 The Tenth Circuit held that the benching
had not affected the three plaintiffs' rights as union members, and that
therefore the trial court incorrectly held that these plaintiffs had been
wrongly denied the due process protections of the Landrum-Griffin Act." 16
Section 101(a)(5) of the Landrum-Griffin Act provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fired, suspended, expelled or otherwise discipl'ned except for nonpayment of
dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such
member has been (A) served with written specific charges;
(B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a
full and fair hearing.117
The plaintiffs had been afforded none of these procedural protections.1 8 The trial court determined that benching fell within the "otherwise
disciplined" language, and that therefore the plaintiffs' rights had been violated." 9 The Union argued on appeal that section 101(a)(5) was intended
to protect workers only against union related disciplinary action, and that
because the discipline imposed on the plaintiffs was not internal Union discipline, the Landrum-Griffin Act's procedural protections were inapplicable. 120 The court of appeals agreed' 2 1 on the basis of the recent United
t22
States Supreme Court decision Finnegan v. Leu.
In Finnegan the petitioners were Union members who were also employed as business agents by the Union.' 23 Petitioners were fired by Leu, the
Union's president, after he had won an election defeating Brown, the union's
former president. 124 Leu felt that petitioners' open support of Brown during
the election cast doubt on their ability to implement the policies and pro112. d at 1240.
113. Id.
114. Set id. at 1238.
115. Id at 1239.
116. Id. at 1239. The district court decision is unreported, but apparently the court ruled
that protection of the Landrum-Griffin Act extended to unwilling participants in a wildcat
strike, perhaps because of the opportunity the Act provides for a hearing before the imposition
of a penalty. If the collective bargaining agreement contained a grievance procedure, the three
unwilling participants in the strike could have filed a grievance against the employer for unfair
discharge and had a hearing in that context. See Emporium Capweli Co. v. Western Addition
Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1976) (emphasis supplied).
118. 694 F.2d at 1238.
119. Id
120. Id.
121. Id at 1239.
122. 456 U.S. 431 (1982).
123. Id at 434. As business agents, petitioners performed confidential, policymaking tasks
for their local. Id
124. Id. at 433-34.
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grams of the new administration. 125 Leu's right to discharge business agents
2 6
was granted by the Union's by-laws.'
Petitioners in Finnegan claimed protection from dismissal in section 609
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959127 (Landrum-Griffin Act), which makes it unlawful for a union official "to fire, suspend, expel or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act."' 28 Among the
Landrum-Griffin Act's guarantees is the right "to express any views, arguments, or opinions." 129 The Supreme Court held that "the term 'discipline,'
as used in section 609, refers only to retaliatory actions that affect a union
member's rights or status as a member of the union" not as its employee.' 30
In construing section 609 the Supreme Court cited the "otherwise disciplined" language from section 101 (a) (5)" 3 ' and its accompanying conference
report to lend force to the distinction it found between union action affecting
a union member's rights as a member and action affecting his rights as an
employee.1 32 The intent of Congress in enacting these sections of the Landrum-Griffin Act was to protect union members against discipline arbitrarily
denying members the rights incident to union membership. 133 Actions
which did not affect those rights-such as loss of an employment position
with the Union-were therefore not discipline within the meaning of section
609,134 and, by implication, section 101(a)(5).
The Tenth Circuit found the analysis in Leu controlling in Hackenburg. 135 The court held that because the benching imposed by the Union
did not affect the disciplined members' rights qua members, the employees
were not disciplined within the meaning of section 101(a)(5). Hence, the
procedural protections of that section were inapplicable, and the trial court
had improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the involuntary
36
strikers. 1
Carol Lindsay *

125. Id. at 434.
126. Id
127. 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1982).
128. Id
129. 29 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (1982).
130. 456 U.S. at 437 (emphasis in original).
131. See supra text accompanying note 116.
132. 456 U.S. at 436.
133. Id at 438.
134. Id at 439. Finnegan also analyzed whether the firing violated the petitioners' speech
rights within the meaning of section 102 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982), which provides an
independent action for deprivations of rights secured by the Act. Id This analysis does not
affect the holding with respect to the scope of the "otherwise disciplined" language, as the two
sections were intended to address different problems. See 456 U.S. at 439 & n. 10.
135. 694 F.2d at 1239.
136. Id
.
Sections I & Ill. Section II was prepared by the Denver Law Journal Editors in conjunction with Ms. Lindsay.

